Crony capitalism

Jag tror att det är professor Magnus Henrekson på IFN, forskningsinstitutet för näringslivsfrågor, som i en intervju i tidskriften NEO introducerade begreppet ”crony capitalism” i svensk debatt.

Detta är definitionen:

A description of capitalist society as being based on the close relationships between businessmen and the state. Instead of success being determined by a free market and the rule of law, the success of a business is dependent on the favoritism that is shown to it by the ruling government in the form of tax breaks, government grants and other incentives.

I senaste The Economist finns en artikel som tydligt beskriver fenomenet:

The Arab Spring has not delivered all that was hoped for it, but it did call time on two egregious examples of crony capitalism. After the revolution in Tunisia in 2011, 214 businesses, and assets worth $13 billion, including 550 properties and 48 boats and yachts, were confiscated from Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the deposed president, and his relatives and associates. In Egypt at least 469 businesses were linked to Hosni Mubarak, ousted as its president soon after Mr Ben Ali, some of which were seized.

Using data that have only come to light since the Arab Spring, World Bank economists have conducted a uniquely detailed study of the damage that crony capitalism does to an economy. Its findings suggest that, among Egypt’s medium-sized and large firms, the politically connected ones made 60% of all the profits in 2010. Yet their share of the economy was far smaller and they provided only 11% of private-sector employment.

In Tunisia the Ben Ali empire dominated the telecoms and air-transport industries, to which entry was highly regulated. They accounted for 21% of total profits in Tunisia in 2010 but only 3% of private-sector output and 1% of jobs. They had far higher profits and market share than non-crony firms in industries in which operating rights and foreign direct investment were heavily regulated. But in lightly regulated sectors they were far less profitable than non-crony rivals.

Although Messrs Mubarak and Ben Ali were swept away along with many of their cronies, the study warns that there is a risk of old habits returning. Egypt’s powerful army, in particular, has cronyish tendencies. Moreover, many of the policies that were conduits of favours to firms with powerful friends, such as energy subsidies and heavy, discretionary regulation of competition and foreign direct investment, remain in place.